|
|
|
 |
|
|
| HOME |
| * UK Policy |
| * US Policy |
| * CTBT |
| * NPT |
| * NATO Policy |
| MISSILE DEFENCE |
| BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS |
| NUCLEAR AND WMD PUBLICATIONS |
| NUCLEAR AND WMD LINKS |
|
ISSUE AREAS: |
| EUROPEAN SECURITY |
| WEAPONS TRADE |
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)Combating Illicit WMD Trafficking
Contents
BASIC PSI Project Objectives
The aim of the project is to form a comprehensive picture of the PSI and how it relates to arms control, international security and international law, especially the framework of current international disarmament organisations (for example the International Atomic Energy Agency) as well as comparably new organisations and loose coalitions, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Port Security Initiative and the Container Security Initiative. BASIC is seeking to fill several 'knowledge gaps' on the PSI, including:
We anticipate that the project activities will lead to the development of, or strengthened support for:
Finally, the research will also illuminate the transatlantic relationship, and develop policy proposals that are likely to strengthen and enhance that relationship. For further details, please contact BASIC's Director, Dr Ian Davis BASIC Publications on the PSI
What is the Proliferation Security Initiative?
PSI objectivesThe PSI seeks to create a web of counter proliferation partnerships through which to combat and prevent 'states and non state actors of proliferation concern' from carrying out their WMD and missile related technology trade. The military objective of PSI is to interdict WMD, or WMD related shipments, between source countries, terrorist organizations and state recipients on land, in the air and on the high seas. PSI participantsAustralia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US form the eleven original participants. Canada, Denmark, Norway Singapore and Turkey all joined in January 2004. The entry of the Russian Federation, in June 2004 brought 'membership' to its current 17. A 'core group' of participating states took an active role in creating the statement of interdiction principles and other activities. The group consisted of the eleven founding members, plus Singapore, Russia and others that joined later. The 'core group' has now been disbanded, all members share equal input opportunities. More than 70 states have expressed support for the PSI, with Argentina, Iraq and Georgia the latest to do so. A number of non-participants, such as Pakistan, have joined PSI exercises as observers. The PSI and International lawOver 100,000 registered merchant vessels participate in international trade. All of these vessels must bear the flag of a Nation-State. All PSI participants, except Turkey, have signed and ratified The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allows each state criminal and civil jurisdiction over ships flying its own flag. In most cases, interdiction would be legal only when carried out by, or with the permission of, the target ships own flag state. The majority of PSI operations on the high seas are likely to be undertaken by states other than the flag state. Therefore, further development of international maritime law may be necessary to ensure swift and efficient interdiction. The PSI could represent the embryonic beginnings of an action, which may grow into an effective multilateral regime. For the time being, the contemplated PSI parameters are constrained by international law. A comprehensive analysis of the relationship between PSI and the Law of the Sea can be found in Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea. Diplomatic DevelopmentsThe statement of interdiction principles It identifies concrete steps to facilitate effective WMD shipment interdiction. The statement encourages PSI States to adopt streamlined intelligence sharing procedures and to strengthen international legal authorities to fulfill their interdiction commitments. The eleven original participants adopted the statement at the Paris meeting, September 2003. The full statement can be found at: http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm Operational experts meetingsBeginning in Brisbane, Australia, in July 2003, the PSI states have completed 13 'operational experts meetings' to date. Details can be found at: http://www.state.gov/t/np/c12684.htm. The next scheduled meeting will be held in Singapore in July 2006. Boarding agreements with flag statesBoarding agreements have been achieved on a bilateral basis only. An agreement between the US and Liberia, the second-largest flag state, was reached in February 2004., An agreement with Panama, the world’s leading flag state, was signed in May 2004. Together these two flag states cover 20% of world merchant shipping, which means the US may now legally board 2 out of ten merchant vessels. The US has reached agreements with other flag states, including the Marshall Islands, Croatia, Belize and Cyprus. Details can be found at: http://www.state.gov/t/np/c12386.htm. The UK in particular, has expressed an interest in ‘piggybacking’ on US bilateral arrangements, but no concrete developments to this end have occurred as yet. Military DevelopmentsJoint interdiction exercises: Operational SuccessesIn November 2003, John Bolton, the then US Under Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation and International Security, publicly acknowledged that some interdictions have taken place. However, operational details, including intelligence sharing procedures, are rarely publicized for security reasons. However, US Administration officials have stated that between April 2005 and April 2006, approximately two-dozen successful interdictions took place. Specifically, it is claimed that co-operation has prevented the export of dual-use goods to Iran's missile programme and heavy water-related equipment destined for its nuclear programme. External PerspectivesThe PSI has been highly successful in securing the participation of numerous key Western states. Most major NATO states are in, plus Russia. Yet a number of key maritime or strategic states remain outside, citing unique concerns and reservations. These include: ChinaChina’s location, unique leverage with the DPRK and burgeoning military capabilities makes its participation highly desirable. Yet this remains unlikely anytime soon. China's official response to the PSI is reflected in remarks by Foreign ministry officials. Zhang Yan, director-general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently reiterated China's reluctance to join the PSI, citing concerns about the legality of interdictions. The following statement, given by a foreign ministry official at a press conference in December 2004, clarifies the Chinese position:. ‘China understands the concerns of the PSI participating countries over the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. However, there are also many concerns in the international community about the legitimacy and effectiveness of PSI interdictions and consequences that may arise therefrom. The PSI participants should take this into serious consideration. China consistently holds the view that proliferation issues should be resolved within the international legal frameworks by political and diplomatic means, and that any non proliferation measures to be taken should serve to promote international and regional peace, security and stability. China has met one of the goals of PSI, by joining in the Container Security Initiative in July 2003. It has allowed for pre-screening of containers destined for the United States from the ports of Shenzhen and Shanghai. IndiaIndia's location, size and growing economic and strategic strength make its participation desirable. But India's response towards the PSI has been, until recently, ambiguous. This was partly influenced by the initial Russian opposition. To India's surprise, Moscow joined the PSI a year later, after the Kremlin's concerns on the legality of the PSI were addressed. India has voiced concerns about the 'two-tiered structure' of the PSI that seems, in the Indian view, to differentiate between the core group and other members. US Under Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation and International Security, Robert Joseph, sought to allay Indian concerns. Speaking recently at a seminar in India on 'South East Asia's role in Non-Proliferation,' he said:
Joseph also sought to allay Indian concerns. He suggested, that having defined the basic principles of interdiction, the maintenance of the 'core group' was no longer necessary. He went on to say:
Despite efforts being made to smooth the way for its inclusion, India has not joined the PSI as yet. Other strategically located statesOther key states still outside the PSI include:
Little or no official PSI related statements from these States have been recorded. It is likely that they will be high priorities for inclusion. *In June 2006, it was reported that the Indonesian government is preparing to join the PSI, although this has yet to be confirmed. The Future of PSI
In Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea, BASIC suggested a number of recommendations for strengthening the PSI. These include:
Selected LinksUS State Department
UK Foreign office
Australian Department of Foreign affairs and trade
Canadian Department of national defence and the Canadian forces website
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The PSI in the media
Other PSI related links
Back to Nuclear and WMD |
|||
With
funding from the Economic and Social Research Council BASIC is tracking
and analysing implementation of the PSI, and is also researching
the implications for international law and international security.
The focus is on interdiction of maritime shipping, but will also
cover other forms of interdiction (in the air and on the ground).
The
US led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) forms one strand
of the 2002 US National Strategy to combat WMD proliferation, which
called for a comprehensive approach to counter the threat of WMD
reaching the hands of terrorists. Frustrated efforts to prevent
the delivery of a shipment of North Korean SCUD missiles to the
Yemen in December 2002, added further impetus to the PSI launch.
President Bush formally announced the initiative on 31 May 2003,
in Krakow, Poland. The PSI is an activity, not an organization.
The
PSI statement of interdiction principles serves as the blueprint
for PSI activities. 
Beginning
with the Australian led maritime interdiction exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR
in September 2003, PSI states have completed 23 maritime, air, ground
and command post interdiction exercises to date, taking turns to
lead. A list of exercises can be found at: 
In
line with the statement of interdiction principles, the PSI seeks
to include more participants, strengthen related international law
and streamline intelligence sharing procedures. The major challenge
for PSI states is to balance their vital security concerns with
often-complex domestic and international legal considerations. |
BASIC UK:
The Grayston Centre, 2nd Floor, 28 Charles Square London N1 6HT,
+44-(0)20-7324 4680 |