The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, January 2005
 
Back to the main page on the
2005 NPT Review Conference.
Contents
Executive Summary
In May 2005, State Parties will gather in New York to review
implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) for the seventh time since its entry into force in
1970, and to identify further areas for progress. The combined
effect of a paradigm shift in US non-proliferation policy away from
reliance on multilateral instruments, a weakening of the political
will among the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to pursue
non-proliferation and disarmament goals, and serious doubts about
the NPT's efficacy to enforce compliance among States Parties, has
threatened the very viability of the regime.
Is it time to give up on the NPT? Should it be amended or even
superseded by a new convention or treaty on nuclear disarmament?
Our analysis leads us to conclude that we should give it one more
try. There is a stark choice to lay before the international
community: Either a breakthrough is made at the 2005 Review
Conference or the NPT may be declared bust at the end of it.
This overview document sets the scene for a series of concise,
issue-based briefings to be published between January and March
2005 that will propose concrete, achievable recommendations to help
strengthen the nonproliferation, compliance, and disarmament
functions of the NPT. Our baseline objective for a successful
outcome at the2005 Review Conference is a strengthened
international non-proliferation consensus, which includes clear and
unambiguous progress on:
- implementing the 'disarmament steps' agreed at the 2000 Review
Conference;
- measures to 'roll back' nascent nuclear weapons capabilities
(as in North Korea and Iran), and to freeze those of the three
non-NPT NWS, India, Pakistan and Israel, and engage them more fully
in the process of non-proliferation;
- measures to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation; and
- strengthening the NPT State Parties' commitments to nuclear
disarmament.
Crisis? What Crisis?
It would appear that there is a remarkable degree of consensus
on the need for the 188 States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to comply with their
agreed obligations.
The problem, of course, is that there is no consensus on what
more is required of States Parties for compliance to be met. This
is because the provisions of the NPT are widely recognised as
discriminatory, open to differing interpretation and unenforceable.
Recent moves to separate nonproliferation obligations from nuclear
disarmament obligations have compounded this problem.
Additionally, three nuclear weapon capable states - Israel,
India and Pakistan stand defiantly outside the provisions of the
NPT and show disdain for the oft repeated, and near futile pleas
for them to join the NPT as Non- Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS).
This small, but highly significant group, has been joined by the
Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, a signatory to the NPT and
formerly a NNWS with currently ambiguous status.
The Conference on Disarmament (CD), the body charged with
implementing non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament measures on
behalf of the United Nations, hasn't even managed to arrange the
chairs around the conference table for the last eight years, never
mind make any substantive progress on the issues before it.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is severely
compromised by a contradictory mandate to both promote the spread
of the peaceful use of nuclear technology for power generation and
to curb the diversion of materials developed by such technology
into weapons programmes. In reality, however, the Agency does a
remarkable job in monitoring the latter and holding the line
against horizontal proliferation. But it has no mandate to
intervene in preventing vertical proliferation.
Universality, so often called for during the 1995 Review
Conference, when the indefinite extension of the NPT was achieved
on the understanding that permanence would provide a platform for
substantive progress, remains a distant dream.
The concept of shared security, transcending narrow definitions
of national security based on the possession and threat of nuclear
retaliation, has been all but buried by the 'declared' Nuclear
Weapons States (NWS). Moreover, this handful of powerful states
continue to try and justify the status quo on the questionable
grounds that their status is 'recognised'. They know this position
has no basis in international law yet they act as though it
does.
The discriminatory nature of the NPT is further reinforced by
declaratory statements of 'other' agreements taking precedence over
the NPT, such as the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement and NATO's
Strategic Concept. Unless, and until, it is generally accepted that
there are no opt-out clauses from the obligations of the NPT to
actively pursue nuclear disarmament in 'good faith', as agreed in
the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, there will remain
no prospect of progress in 2005, and beyond. NNWS within alliances
like NATO can no longer shelter under the nuclear umbrella provided
by NWS and maintain the pretence that they are in good standing
under the NPT - they aren't and they must be challenged.
On the other hand the emphasis by the NNWS on their
'inalienable' right to develop nuclear technology needs to be
balanced by recognition of the further restrictions and controls
necessary to prevent latent proliferation.
Attempts to paper over the cracks by restating that the NPT is
the cornerstone of international arms control, that the NWS are
moving forward on dismantlement of their nuclear arsenals, and that
the NPT has served the international community well for 35 years
will not suffice. The status quo will only serve to further build
resentment and retrenchment. All must move beyond their usual
rhetoric if practical, concrete progress is to be made.
So, is it time to give up on the NPT as some experts have
advocated and some academics and officials have implied? Should it
be amended or even superseded by a new convention or treaty on
nuclear disarmament?
Our analysis leads us to conclude that we should give it one
more try. We should continue to believe that reasonable people
behave rationally with the best interests of human security in mind
and to reinforce agreed behaviour, whether arrived at by common
custom or by tabulated statute passing into international law.
As Dr ElBaradei, Director General IAEA, stated in a recent
article:
"The twin crises of compliance with NPT obligations - namely,
the engagement of some NNWS in undeclared nuclear activities,
coupled with the failure of the NWS to take concrete, verifiable
and irreversible steps to eliminate their nuclear arsenals - have
led to a crisis of confidence in the NPT regime.
The solution is... to work towards an equitable system that
will provide the security of all. Despite any appearances to the
contrary, this is an achievable goal - but only if it is rooted in
rule-based multilateralism."[1]
Moreover, the spectre of nuclear terrorism, a growing threat
since 9/11 and an issue of relatively little import at recent
previous Review Conferences, will undoubtedly cast its shadow over
the Conference and needs to be factored into the equation. There is
a stark choice to lay before the international community: Either a
breakthrough is made at the next NPT Review Conference or it may be
declared bust at the end of May 2005.
Dr ElBaradei has signposted the way forward:
"The earlier we focus on collective security reform, the
earlier we can move forward towards agreement on strengthening the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and towards a concrete programme for
verified, irreversible nuclear disarmament, complete with a
timetable. Such a course of action could be achieved in the context
of a protocol to the present NPT. Once in force, this new framework
should be regarded as a 'peremptory norm' of international law - in
short, it should be enduring and permanent."[2]
Evidently, much work lies before us. Denials of impending crisis
must be seen as part of the problem and as an indication of planned
inactivity.
Need for Progress in 2005 and How To Achieve
It
In May 2005, State Parties will gather in New York to review
implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) for the seventh time since its entry into force in
1970, and to identify further areas for progress. Preventing both
horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons technology
to Non-Nuclear Weapons States, and potentially to non-state actors)
and vertical proliferation (the development of new nuclear weapons
or enhancements to existing nuclear arsenals by the Nuclear Weapon
States) is vital to the security of all states.
The 2000 NPT Review Conference broke new ground for global
nonproliferation efforts. In the Final Document, all states agreed
to an historic 'Programme of Action' or '13 practical steps'
towards the goal of accomplishing the elimination of the world's
nuclear arsenals.
Unfortunately, the combined effect of a paradigm shift in US
nonproliferation policy away from reliance on multilateral
instruments, a weakening of the political will among the NWS to
pursue non-proliferation and disarmament goals, and serious doubts
about the NPT's efficacy to enforce compliance among States
Parties, has threatened the very viability of the regime.
Hence, the prospects at present are not good for a successful
seventh NPT Review Conference. The constructive and progressive
programme of the 2000 NPT Review Conference has met resistance and
redefinition. Stagnation and even failure look likely at this
stage.
This document argues that the Review Conference must achieve a
substantive breakthrough in 2005 based on the 2000 Final Document.
It, therefore, considers the crucial achievements of the 2000
Review Conference and the inconsequential 2002, 2003 and 2004
PrepComs. It also introduces a series of concise, issue-based
briefings to be published between January and March that will
propose concrete, achievable recommendations.
The 2000 Review Conference Final Document
The content of the Final Document from the 2000 Review
Conference was agreed by consensus and was considered to have
far-reaching consequences. Not a timetable of actions needed for
complete implementation of States Parties obligations, but clearly
achievable confidence-building measures and practical suggestions
for moving forward. It was viewed at the time as an extension of
the 'step-by-step' approach favoured by the Nuclear Weapon States
(NWS), and supported by allied Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS),
and a means of strengthening the historic agreement to indefinitely
extend the NPT in 1995.
A 'Programme of Action' (often referred to as the '13 practical
steps towards global nuclear disarmament') became part of the Final
Document. They are summarised as:
1 Progress needs to be made on entry-into-force of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
2 The moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions must be
maintained.
3 The Conference on Disarmament (CD) must move forward in
establishing a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).
4 A subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear
disarmament is needed.
5 The principle of irreversibility on arms control and reduction
agreements must be applied to nuclear disarmament measures.
6 Progress on nuclear disarmament (implementation of Article VI)
is required.
7 Implementation of arms reduction agreements and pursuit of
binding agreements on further irreversible reductions must be
instituted.
8 Greater emphasis must be attached to the implementation of the
Trilateral Initiative and greater support must be forthcoming for
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
9 Confidence building measures and progressive steps to lower
the nuclear threshold must be offered.
10 Further fissile material stocks must be put under IAEA
Safeguards.
11 The ultimate objective of complete nuclear disarmament must
be reaffirmed.
12 The formal reporting back by States Parties between Review
Conferences - the accountability principle - must be
instituted.
13 Enhanced verification measures must be agreed and
implemented.
Attached to Step 9 of the '13 Steps' were six suggested means of
moving towards nuclear disarmament. They can be summarised as:
- increased effort by the NWS to reduce their nuclear arsenals
unilaterally;
- increased transparency by the NWS about their nuclear weapons
capability;
- further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
- a reduction in the operational status of nuclear weapons
(de-alerting);
- a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies
(doctrines);
- and the engagement of all NWS in facilitating the elimination
of nuclear weapons.
Despite prevarication and an unwillingness by some States
Parties to engage in substantive discussions until the very last
minute (by which time the prospect of failure forced a compromise),
the 2000 Review Conference was widely considered to have been a
success - on paper at least.
The Three Preparatory Committees
(2002-04)
The 2002 Preparatory Committee was a difficult and
sometimes contentious gathering with the NWS unwilling to move
forward on the 2000 Review Conference agreements and the NNWS
coalescing around the principle of standardising reporting by
States Parties on their progress on measures to achieve nuclear
disarmament - the so-called 'accountability principle'. This one
issue, and the lack of preparedness by NWS to compromise on it,
almost resulted in the Conference Chairman suspending the
meeting.
In the event, a Chairman's factual summary was presented and the
meeting was closed without further debate. It was generally
regarded as a comprehensive summary and welcomed by most
delegations and NGO observers. However, the lack of any political
will to move towards universal compliance was considered a major,
even debilitating problem. Specifically, progress on ratification
of the CTBT, movement on Article VI, codification of negative
security assurances, weakness and overstretch at the IAEA and the
role of standardised reporting were highlighted for substantive
attention in advance of the Review Conference.
The 2003 Preparatory Committee saw an increase in the
level of interaction, which was a noteworthy improvement, but there
was no mistaking the general concern that the withdrawal of North
Korea, the invasion of Iraq and the increasing attention paid to
Iran presented profound challenges to the NPT. In the absence of
substantial progress, agreement or flexibility, an increase in the
level of engagement was welcomed but it was also indicative of low
expectations going into the PrepCom.
The Chairman's factual summary consisted of the amalgamation of
the submissions of various delegations, an approach that was
generally welcomed. However, it did run the risk that disagreements
arising from the language of the text would result in its rejection
by some States Parties. In the event, significant - and predictable
- problems arose regarding the language on Iran and on the Middle
East generally.
The United States, while agreeing with the emphasis given to the
issue of compliance, felt that the summary should have devoted
greater attention to Iran's nuclear programme, although they
welcomed the naming of Iran. The summary stated that Iran's nuclear
facilities raised "the most serious questions" about that State's
nuclear intentions and ambitions. With respect to this, it was
further maintained that Article IV benefits (of assistance with
peaceful nuclear technology) were not "a guaranteed entitlement".[3]
The 2004 Preparatory Committee was charged with producing
recommendations and finalising arrangements for the Review
Conference, including an agenda. However, no substantive
recommendations were adopted and no agreements on how to move
forward on the 2000 Final Document were agreed. Independent
analyst, Rebecca Johnson, concluded that the NPT was becoming more
vulnerable and that four connected problems needed to be addressed
in 2005:
- the erosion of confidence in the regime's ability to meet
states' security interests;
- the failure of the review process to deliver more credible
pressure for full implementation and accountability under the
treaty;
- the absence of effective mechanisms by which States Parties can
exert their collective will when faced with non-compliance or
violations;and
- the continued treatment of NWS' disarmament obligations as
secondclass commitments, to be pursued at their own time and pace
and only if completely convenient.[4]
Time to give up on the NPT or Compliance By
All, For All?
In his statement to the 2004 PrepCom, US Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton
stated:
"There is a crisis of NPTnoncompliance, and the challenge before
us is to devise ways to ensure full compliance with the Treaty's
nonproliferation objectives. Without such compliance by all
members, confidence in the security benefits derived from the NPT
will erode."[5]
In a little reported comment during a BBC interview, the
retiring European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Chris Patten
stated:
"I am afraid that one of the things which is going to inhibit
our attempts in the next decades to deal with the problem of
potential manufacture, use and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, is the fact that we have been applying double
standards and that it's very difficult for us to argue that there
is something morally wrong about other countries developing their
nuclear capacities when we don't in the countries which actually
have nuclear weapons, for example, live up to all our commitments
under the NPT. So we have, I think, if we're going to make progress
in this area, to look at our own responsibilities as well as what
we expect of others."[6]
Former US Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Robert
Grey, said in November 2004:
"It would be a fatal mistake to load [the Review Conference]
up with new rhetoric and push for unacceptable goals because that
just makes it easier for your opposition to reject. The arms
control community should take a reasonable, steady, moderate agenda
and continue to push it at the NPT Review Conference."[7]
The UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
reported in early December 2004 that:
"The nuclear non proliferation regime is now at risk because
of lack of compliance with existing commitments, withdrawal or
threat of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons to escape those commitments, a changing
international security environment and the diffusion of technology.
We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the
non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a
cascade of proliferation."[8]
The British American Security Information Council and Oxford
Research Group concur with these statements. Hard choices need to
be made. Through our forthcoming briefing series we will map out a
path to compliance by all States Parties, for all
States Parties.
Notes
[1] Preserving the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, Mohamed ElBaradei, Disarmament Forum,
UNIDIR four 2004.
[2] ibid.
[3] NPT 2003 PrepCom
Report, Dr Fiona Simpson, 21 May 2003 (http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/2003prepcom/NPT_Report.htm).
[4] Is the NPT up to the
challenge of proliferation? Rebecca Johnson. Disarmament Forum,
UNIDIR four 2004.
[5] "The NPT: A Crisis of
Non-Compliance", John Bolton, New York, April 27 2004.
[6] Chris Patten interview
with James Cox, BBC World This Weekend, 10 October 2004.
[7] Reasonable Goals Needed
for 2005 NPT Conference, Former U.S. Officials Say Following Bush
Re-Election, by Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, November 8
2004.
[8] A more secure world:
Our shared responsibility, Report of the Secretary- General's
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (http://www.un.org/secureworld).
Briefing Series and Recommendations
BASIC and ORG will develop a set of recommendations to
helpstrengthen the non-proliferation, compliance, and
disarmamentfunctions of the NPT in a series of issue-based
briefings. The baselineobjective for a successful outcome at the
2005 Review Conference is astrengthened international
non-proliferation consensus, which includes clearand unambiguous
progress on:
- implementing the 'disarmament steps' agreed at the 2000 Review
Conference;
- measures to 'roll back' nascent nuclear weapons capabilities
(as in North Korea and Iran) and to freeze those of the three
non-NPT NWS: India, Pakistan and Israel, and engage them more fully
in the process of non-proliferation;
- measures to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation; and
- strengthening the NPT State Parties commitments to nuclear
disarmament.
Further information on the briefing series and other project
updates will be available on our websites:
www.basicint.org
www.oxfordresearchgroup.org
The briefing series will start from the premise that the NPT is
flawed but redeemable, given the political will of States Parties
to engage productively and move forward on existing obligations.
The briefings will address:
An assessment of Article VI progress made by each NWS
US-led counter proliferation initiatives
New nuclear weapons developments
The US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement and the NPT
NATO strategic doctrine and the NPT
The moratorium on testing and Entry into Force of the CTBT
The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
Iran and the NPT North Korea and the NPT
Codification of Negative Security Assurances
Strengthening safeguards and enhancing the role of the IAEA
Strengthening the NPT via increased transparency and
accountability
The extension of regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
Achieving rollback - the instruments of diplomacy
Ensuring and/or enforcing compliance
The format of the briefings will be two-to-four pages in length,
and written in a clear and easily digestible style, using
non-technical language throughout. Each briefing will review the
background to an issue, a description of recent (post 2000 Review
Conference) events, its current status and future prospects, and
provide clear recommendations for ways forward, including the means
of implementation.
A final Pre-Conference Report will be issued in the immediate
run up to the Review Conference, summarizing again the main issues
and our final recommendations.
The principal audience for these briefings will be NPT State
Parties delegations. We are targeting all the delegations in order
to help broaden awareness, interest and participation at this
important time, since experience tells us that previous Review
Conferences have been dominated by a few powerful states. With the
world on the edge of nuclear anarchy, it is vital that as many
State Parties as possible become actively engaged in this
process.
BASIC
British American Security Information Council
Founded in 1987, BASIC is one of the few organizations promoting
strategies for a more secure world across the range of conflict
issue areas, from civil wars to the potential use of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). With offices in Washington and London,
BASIC's mission is to research and provide a critical examination
of future decision points in transatlantic security policy,
including: (a) arms control and disarmament policies involving
nuclear and biological weapons, and other WMD; (b) national,
regional and international security strategies including, but not
limited to, peacekeeping, conflict management, and conflict
resolution, and the control of terrorism; and (c) arms transfers
and the international weapons trade. BASIC also promotes public
awareness and understanding of these policies in Europe and North
America in order to foster informed debate and creative and
sustainable solutions, both within the transatlantic security
community and in the community's external relations with other
parts of the world.
ORG
Oxford Research Group
Oxford Research Group (ORG) is a public company limited by
guarantee with charitable status, governed by a Board of Directors,
and supported by a Council of Advisors. It was established in 1982,
and works to develop effective methods for people to bring about
positive change on issues of national and international security by
non-violent means. Our main activities are the publishing of
policy-relevant reports and briefings, the holding of meetings and
consultations - both public and off-the-record - involving policy
makers, and the provision of training and support for citizen and
NGO groups in non-confrontational dialogue methods. High-level
civil servants, diplomats, scientists, academics, and analysts
attend our consultations. Most of our work has a strong
international element, with particularly well-developed links
within UN circles, with the United States, and with China.
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