Getting to Zero
June 4, 2009
During the past month or two, getting to zero seemed to resemble the early phase of the “butterfly effect” of Chaos Theory. The thinking goes as follows: the movement of air caused by a butterfly flapping his wings could contribute to the formation of a hurricane, or other major weather event. Without that one extra factor of the flapping of the butterfly’s wings, the event may not have occurred. Of course, the flapping of a butterfly’s wings alone cannot cause a weather event. Similarly, recent arms control negotiations and political developments, when taken alone, will clearly not create a world without nuclear weapons, but they could become part of a chain of events that lead toward significant progress for getting to zero in the distant future.
• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting (NPT PrepCom - held from May 4-15 in New York) went better than NPT conferences of recent memory. Members agreed upon an agenda for the Review Conference (RevCon), which they will hold in May 2010. However, NPT members were unable to agree on a document of recommendations for the RevCon. Reflective of past problems, some representatives felt that the draft document did not do enough to hold nuclear weapons states to their disarmament commitments that they had made under the treaty. Others felt that the emphasis on non-proliferation overshadowed the “right” of member states to obtain access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Still, the United States in particular exuded a more cooperative tone and other member states’ representatives welcomed this development. In addition, for the first time in 10 years, the Conference on Disarmament adopted a work plan. But the question remains, will the rapprochement actually lead to a strong NPT RevCon and movement in the CD on an agreement to ban fissile materials, among other would-be hallmarks of progress?
• President Obama indicated that he had heard the voices of the NPT PrepCom’s discontents, saying in a speech in Cairo on June 4: “I understand those who protest that some countries have weapons that others do not. No single nation should pick and choose which nation holds nuclear weapons. And that’s why I strongly reaffirmed America’s commitment to seek a world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons.” Although the President has repeatedly stated this goal, will he be able to convince his administration colleagues, and legislative leaders, that they need to work together to bring about the actual policy changes required to reduce nuclear weapons? Or will his support for the vision go the wayside of previous presidents, only to be overwhelmed by a myriad of other urgent concerns?
• His former opponent, Senator John McCain (Arizona), made a point of highlighting his support for a world without nuclear weapons during a floor speech honoring fellow Republican and former President Ronald Reagan on June 3. Will the Senator’s support for the vision of a world without nuclear weapons lead him to vote for ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)? And will he use his political clout to gain the support of other conservatives for the passage of the CTBT and other arms control initiatives?
• Russia and the United States have held a series of substantive discussions on the follow-up to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), with the most recent meeting having occurred on June 1-3. The details of the follow-up agreement may be ready as soon as July, when Presidents Medvedev and Obama are scheduled to meet. How deep will nuclear warhead reductions go? Will the agreement be ratified by their legislatures back home before the expiration of the current treaty at the end of the year? And will the negotiations go well enough to allow another agreement down the road; one that could lead to additional nuclear reductions – possibly on a multilateral basis with other nuclear weapons states?
• The Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture released its report earlier in May. Although the Commission issued its support for further nuclear reductions, especially as part of the START follow-up negotiations, its members failed to agree on supporting CTBT ratification or the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. How much of an impact will the Commission’s report have on Congress and the Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)? Also of relevance, the Commission’s report included the following philosophical reflection:
“We should also recognize the role that U.S. foreign policy more broadly speaking plays in helping to create the conditions that might ultimately enable the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Without a fundamental transformation of international politics there will be no elimination of the conditions that cause some states and terrorists to seek nuclear weapons.”(p. 75)
As with the “butterfly effect,” whether the abovementioned developments contribute to such a transformation may depend on factors that are unaccounted for now, and also depend on the multitude of decisions that are made next. For example, North Korea’s nuclear test of May 25 could send winds either way. Much will depend on whether leaders choose to use the test as another reason to retain their current nuclear postures, or as a reason to justify the push for the global elimination of these weapons. Surely, the conclusion of a START follow-up treaty and the U.S. ratification of the CTBT could have positive reinforcing effects on the NPT and CD. Despite North Korea’s most recent vie for attention, other winds appear to be blowing in a more encouraging direction.
Chris Lindborg
April 10, 2009
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s recent announcement that Russia will be upgrading its military forces in the face of western encroachment (among other reasons) underscores the tenuousness of U.S.-Russian relations. Despite enthusiasm shown by both sides for strengthening ties under President Obama, Washington and Moscow have very different, often conflicting, strategic interests. A comment Medvedev made justifying the upgrade reflects this situation. “An analysis of the military-political situation in the world shows that there are a range of regions where there remains serious potential for conflicts,” he explained. Eastern Europe is one of those regions. Therefore, it is imperative that negotiations for a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) remain, to the greatest extent possible, isolated from other aspects of U.S.-Russian relations.
This can be accomplished by focusing on the details of the treaty. Generally speaking, the U.S. and Russian positions have grown much closer under President Obama. Like the Kremlin, his administration wants to draft a comprehensive, legally binding treaty which commits both sides to further reductions. Obama’s nomination of Rose Gottemoeller as assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance is a promising development in achieving this goal. At her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Gottemoeller described the expiration of START as a “new opportunity to achieve greater security for our country by reinforcing stability and predictability in the strategic nuclear relationship with Russia.” Such a perspective indicates a desire to negotiate a solid successor treaty as part of commitment to disarmament as a whole. The task now is to iron out the contours of a new treaty. Negotiators will have to decide on the exact number for reductions, the type of verification procedures, and what to do about delivery vehicles, deployed offensive weapons outside of national borders, and uploading capability. It must be noted that Washington and Moscow remain apart on many of these issues. But reaching an agreement or at least an acceptable compromise on such points is essential to draft a new treaty.
The good news is that Presidents Obama and Medvedev recognize this necessity. In their joint statement following their first meeting at the G20 Summit in London, they instructed negotiators to focus on these issues, and to have a treaty drafted by July. Such marching orders indicate that both sides are serious about working out the nuts and bolts by the December 5 deadline. The fact that the two presidents cited their “joint responsibility” to draft a treaty is also encouraging. It further underscores that fact that they view it as a matter of necessity. And while they may not agree on many of the details, their differences are not irreconcilable. There is ample room for compromise.
The bad news is that there is a danger of other aspects of their relationship affecting negotiations. The administration has been approaching the START successor as part of a larger project to improve bi-lateral relations. Following a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Seregi Lavrov in Geneva in early March, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described treaty negotiations as part of a “very broad agenda” to reestablish trust between Moscow and Washington. While she made clear that drafting a new treaty was the top priority, this agenda also includes issues which will most likely continue to be divisive. Going even farther in a recent interview, Sergei Koselov, the deputy head of the Russian foreign ministry’s security and disarmament department, explicitly linked the success of these negotiations with this broader agenda. “To have a new document on December 5… above all it is necessary to have a clear change in the climate of Russian-U.S. relations,” he said.
While improving the relationship is a worthwhile endeavor, it is risky to lump treaty negotiations in with this effort. Here again, the Kremlin’s reasons for upgrading its military are revealing. The primary motives are western encroachment into Russia’s sphere of influence, and regional conflicts, in addition to international terrorism. What exactly constitutes western encroachment? NATO expansion, disputes over natural resources in Central Asia, and missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech Republic. And what of regional conflicts? They’re a product of hostilities between Russia and its neighbors, many of whom are supported for economic, strategic, and moral reasons by the United States. In other words, the sources of these conflicts reflect important objectives held by Washington and Moscow. These objectives are practically inverse, and with the exception of missile defense, do not have strong prospects for compromise. At the very least they could impede efforts to improve bi-lateral relations. If the success of treaty negotiations is affected by problems in these areas, negotiations are likely to stall, leaving no new agreement in place by the December 5 deadline.
Fortunately, at least one member of the Obama administration grasps the importance of keeping the negotiations isolated. At her confirmation hearing, Gottemoeller acknowledged that U.S.-Russian relations have become strained in recent years. But she pointed out that arms reduction agreements were first reached between the two during the height of the Cold War, when their relationship was much worse. She further explained that a new treaty can be reached by the deadline if negotiations remain “tight and focused” on the issues at hand. Gottemoeller’s advice should be the administration’s theme throughout the deliberations.
Now, there are issues that are sure to affect the outcome of a new treaty. Russian officials have made clear that Washington’s final decision on missile defense in Eastern Europe will be a factor. Similarly, the United States is unlikely to let the Iranian threat go unaddressed. Concerns regarding these situations will have to be accommodated, which will be difficult, although not impossible. That is precisely why other contentious issues should not be allowed to intervene. Missile defense and Iran, not to mention the details of the treaty itself, will be hard enough. Of course there is also the option to extend START by up to five years, but this would be a disappointment. It would provide for no further reductions, since both sides have long since reached the levels stipulated by this treaty. But if Russia and the United States are able to keep negotiations “tight and focused,” regardless of other problems that may arise in their bi-lateral relations, a comprehensive treaty can be implemented.
Jonathan McLaughlin, BASIC
March 17, 2009
On March 17 U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown delivered a speech before the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Conference at Lancaster House in London. Expanding the agenda of the upcoming G20 Summit beyond repairing the global economy, he emphasized the need to take a “broader view” and work to establish a “new global society.” Central to this proposal was for nations to cooperate in reducing nuclear arsenals.
The Prime Minister explained how the growing number of states with nuclear weapons increases the risk of proliferation to terrorist organizations. To counter this threat, he announced that the United Kingdom will embark on a “Road to 2010″ Plan, a reference to the upcoming 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The Plan, which he hopes to publish this summer, will include “detailed proposals on civil nuclear power, disarmament and non-proliferation, on fissile material security and the role and development of the [International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA].”
Brown said that under the NPT, all states with nuclear weapons are required to gradually reduce their arsenals: “We are not asking non-nuclear states to refrain from proliferation while nuclear weapons states amass new weapons. We are asking them not to proliferate while nuclear weapons states take steps to reduce their own arsenals in line with the [NPT]’s requirements.” He suggested the creation of regional civilian nuclear organizations, which would work in conjunction with an international body, to ensure access to civilian nuclear technology while reducing and preventing proliferation risks.
While Brown was conciliatory toward states that cooperate with the NPT, he advocated stronger measures against those who violate it, singling out Iran. He advocated for the imposition of sanctions against NPT member states who failed to cooperate with the IAEA. Such a measure would impose a much stricter regime than the one currently in place. His remarks were in line with his previous staunch criticism of Iran’s nuclear program. But the Prime Minister made clear in today’s speech, “Iran has the same absolute right to a peaceful nuclear programme - civil nuclear programme - as any other country.”
To prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear material, he said that “universally implemented international standards for the protection of fissile material” would be necessary. To this end he announced that the United Kingdom would be doubling its contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.
Brown concluded with a general call to disarmament. He urged the United States and Russia to make drastic cuts in their nuclear arsenals, and also advocated a “multilateral agenda” which would include negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty and universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The Prime Minister has previously expressed support for President Obama’s plan to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. However, 10 Downing Street has refused to abandon Trident, with Brown noting in today’s address, “For future submarines our latest assessment is that we can meet this requirement with 12 - not 16 - missile tubes as are on current submarines” and added, “If it is possible to reduce the number of U.K. warheads further, consistent with our national deterrence and with the progress of multilateral discussions, Britain will be ready to do so.”
Jonathan McLaughlin, BASIC
February 18, 2009
Carrying out President Obama’s pledge to secure loose nuclear materials and strengthen the nonproliferation regime, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) plans to increase nonproliferation funding to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) over the next several years and has set out plans to cancel funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.
According to a report* from the February 12th edition of Inside the Pentagon , under the budget guidance (which permits agencies to provide feedback before the budget proposal is finalized), the NNSA will receive an additional $80 million in FY 2010, an increase which will increase exponentially each year until FY 2019, when it will reach $862 million. The NNSA will be receiving $2 billion in FY 2010 for nonproliferation efforts alone, which includes the $80 million increase. Such a figure represents a dramatic spike from the amount spent on nonproliferation in FY 2008, which totaled less than $1 billion. Equally as important, the OMB in its guidance also effectively cancels RRW, “both explicitly and implicitly.” It pressures the NNSA to halt RRW funding to explicit accounts and to discontinue research related to the program.
This guidance represents perhaps the most significant policy development regarding nonproliferation to date to come from the young administration. The dramatic increase in funding for nonproliferation, combined with the cutting off of money to RRW, suggests, more than rhetoric or even policy statements, how the Obama Administration plans to combat the nuclear threat. After all, there are very few things that indicate intent more clearly than funding allocation. It seems as though the new president is implementing a cooperative approach to nonproliferation. The NNSA has a history of working effectively with other nations to secure nuclear materials. With more resources at its disposal, these efforts should increase. What is more, OMB guidance could also reflect a resolution of the tension between President Obama and Defense Secretary Gates regarding RRW, a program Mr. Gates has supported.
On the international scale, these budget plans may provide incentives for other states to step up their nonproliferation efforts and to reduce emphasis on new weapons technology. This is especially true of the United Kingdom, where the nuclear weapons relationship with the United States has been close. Assuming that RRW is cancelled, it will send a strong signal to the United Kingdom and other countries about the Obama Administration’s priorities.
*Access to this article requires a subscription.
Jonathan McLaughlin, BASIC
February 7, 2009
Henry Kissinger has just delivered another important speech, this week at the Munich conference. It contains a number of important challenges to anyone involved in the nuclear debate. One he rightly focuses on is Iran as a major puzzle within the necessary moves towards zero:
I have long advocated negotiations with Iran on a broad front, including the geopolitical aspect. Too many treat this as a kind of psychological enterprise. In fact, it will be tested by concrete answers to four specific questions: a) How close is Iran to a nuclear weapons capability? b) At what pace is it moving? c) What balance of rewards and penalties will move Iran to abandon it? d) What do we do if, despite our best efforts, diplomacy fails?
These questions sum up the prevailing debate within the west towards Iran, and I would contend hide some important assumptions. The first is that the first two questions matter greatly to the greater disarmament project. While clearly they impact on a sense of urgency and on the political will to act one way or another, unless Iran is decades away from a nuclear weapon capability, does it really make a difference to the willingness of existing nuclear powers to engage in serious disarmament if Iran were, say 2 or 10 years away from a capability? Irrespective of their true intentions and the timeline, the potential of Iran’s acquisition of a capability in future both undermines the willingness to disarm, and illustrates the dangers arising from global nuclear arsenals.
The second is that Iran is going to respond to a carrot and stick approach, as if it were a donkey. Of course incentives play an important role, but so too does group psychology - such as national pride. There are alsowhat rationalists would call powerful perverse incentives, and a rational calculus that works against us. Ahmadinejad’s popularity has been strengthened byhis national story of unfair isolation by the West and his standing up to the bully. Yet to hold the hand of peace out now, just before the election, could further strengthen his hand by apparently vindicating his position. Timing could be more important when it comes to the negotiation strategy than when applied to the state of Iran’s nuclear program. So it’s not simply a case of rewards and punishments - it’s also how it is sold, how we consider changing our relationship with the Islamic Republic in a way that recognises the traps we have inadvertently laid for ourselves in the past or that have been laid for us.
Lastly, what do we do if diplomacy fails? Perhaps the biggest chestnut of all, and the one that attracts most of the attention in western capitals. Focusing on failure like this is more likely to ensure it happens. What politician ever goes in to a Presidential election focusing their energies on what to do when they don’t get elected?There is every chance that the current strategy will fail because western leaders are trapped in their own way of zero-sum thinking whereby Iran is going to have to neutralise its threat to us one way or another or face the consequences. If instead we were to spend more time considering the rich variety of perspectives that compete to make up Iran’s perspective and seek to meet some of the more legitimate internatinoalist aspirations (such as a stable Iran being an important regional player) we are more likely to achieve insights and then breakthroughs in negotiations. Let’s focus on the positive for a change!
Paul Ingram, BASIC
Next Page »
|
