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NATO
FALL 2002/PRAGUE SUMMIT
AS NATO GETS BIGGER, CAN IT DOWNSIZE NUCLEAR RISKS?
By Alistair Millar* and Kathryn Crandall
November 2002
INTRODUCTION
Much has been made recently of NATO's new relationship with
Russia and the opportunity to build upon the progress of the
NATO-Russia Council established this past spring in Rome.
Despite the excitement generated about the new or "transformed"
NATO, it is clear that nuclear weapons-paired with distinctly
Cold War-reminiscent strategies-remain very much a core part
of the alliance. Lord Robertson has said that the concept
of deterrence is at the heart of NATO's philosophy and nuclear
posture, "and so long as there are nuclear weapons in the
world there is a role for NATO's nuclear posture."(1)
Perhaps the most tangible reminder of the centrality of NATO's
nuclear weapons posture are the estimated 150-180 U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons (TNWs) that remain stationed in seven NATO
countries in Europe(2) and probable thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in various
states of repair in Russia.(3) The failure to consider nuclear weapons and policies in discussions
leading up to the Prague Summit has been short-sighted. By
integrating nuclear weapons into the discussion at Prague,
NATO would have had the opportunity to set an agenda of leadership
on non-proliferation and arms control efforts that would greatly
enhance global security.
Nuclear Terrorism and the Problem of Tactical Nuclear
Weapons in Europe and Russia
With growing concerns about the threat of nuclear terrorism
after September 11, 2001, officials in the United States and
NATO have pointed to a lingering problem regarding Russia's
tactical nuclear arsenal (a class of weapons similar to the
type of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on the soil of several
NATO member states in Europe). TNW's are potentially vulnerable
to terrorists or nations who might try to buy or steal them.
These weapons are smaller and more portable than strategic
nuclear weapons and could be used without the authority of
centralized command and control oversight mechanisms.
Despite several decades of nuclear arms control initiatives,
non-strategic, or TNWs, are not covered by any formal treaties.
The U.S. and Russian Presidential nuclear initiatives of the
early 1990's called for voluntary controls on the vast stocks
of these weapons. While significant reductions resulted from
the Presidential initiatives, they were informal and lacked
a codified agreement setting out verification and legal obligations.
Reporting on the progress made in storing, dismantling or
eliminating these weapons has been very vague, particularly
by Russian officials.(4) As a result, serious
questions remain unanswered about the extent to which progress
has been made in recent years on these initiatives. The Russian
tactical arsenal is thought to lack stringent centrally coordinated
procedures for accounting, securing and ensuring safety procedures
for transport and storage. Without reliable data on the vast
number Soviet-era tactical weapons, no one can be sure if
there have been diversions or thefts.
United States and NATO TNW Concerns
High-ranking former US officials have noted that Russian
tactical nuclear weapons "are the nuclear weapons most attractive
to terrorists--even more attractive to them than [fissile
bomb-making] material, and much more portable than strategic
warheads."(5) U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee that
he wants "to see to it that theater nuclear weapons are brought
up and talked about, not from a standpoint of [reductions]
but of transparency."(6) U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell explained that: "Tactical nuclear weapons
remain an issue…we have complied with what we said
we were going to do on a unilateral basis back in 1991 and
'92, the Russians still have quite a few in various states
of repair, disrepair, in need of maintenance, and operational.
And so all of these issues will have to be worked as part
of moving forward."(7)
NATO has also acknowledged that it has had concerns about
the uncertainty of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and has
called upon Russia "to bring to completion the reductions
in these forces announced in 1991-1992, and to further review
tactical nuclear weapons." NATO has proposed a set of transparency
measures to Russia in a document titled "Options for Confidence
and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-proliferation
and Arms Control". Among other constructive recommendations,
NATO has called for reciprocal data exchanges on U.S. and
Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces (or TNW) that "would
involve conducting a reciprocal data exchange with Russia
within the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) context. The objective
would be to enhance transparency and knowledge of the size
of the U.S. and Russian stockpiles." (8)
Along with previous efforts by NATO to encourage exchanges
of information with Russia about their non-strategic nuclear
weapons, this effort is commendable. Unfortunately, these
proposals and agreements have failed to achieve many tangible
results. If "countering terrorism is at the heart of NATO's
new relationship with Russia"(9) as Lord
Robertson says, the alliance will have to ensure that it implements
measures to address at least four current and potential impediments
to progress in this area:
1. Outdated NATO Recommendations
The first problem is that NATO's recommendations are out
of date. The creation of a new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) --
promoting the concept of including Russia "in NATO at 20"
rather than under the previous formulation of "NATO 191" --
is said to be showing promise and likely to be more constructive
than the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (June 1997-May
2002).
However, the set of confidence building measures outlined
by NATO in December of 2000 should be updated, not only to
reflect increased threats of terrorism since September 11,
2001, but also to ensure that data exchanges are effectively
addressed in the context of the new NRC. In this way, updated
recommendations should facilitate joint action and an implemental
plan of data exchanges by NATO and Russia at the highest decision
making level. To monitor and ensure that progress is made
in this area, substantive reports should be provided to legislative
oversight committees in NATO Member States and possibly to
the United Nations Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Preparatory
Commission Chairperson. This latter proposal would be a tangible
step toward NATO's "determination to strengthen the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to contribute to the implementation
of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference."(10)
2. Outdated Political and Military Rationale for TNW
A second reason for lack of progress lies in continued adherence
to outmoded military and political justifications for these
weapons. Tactical nuclear forces continue to be viewed as
an essential security guarantee in both Europe and Russia.
NATO has dramatically reduced its nuclear forces in the post-Cold
War era, but it still expects participation in nuclear roles
by its European allies.
For the alliance, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons
on European soil ensures that allies on both sides of the
Atlantic are sharing the risk and the burden associated with
NATO's nuclear mission. Politicians in Europe are said to
prefer to keep the issue of allowing the arsenal to remain
in Europe off the table altogether in order to quell public
awareness and concern. In effect, NATO is obstructing an obvious
opportunity to encourage and assist Russia in addressing a
serious proliferation threat.
3. NATO Expansion
A third stumbling block will arise as NATO expands eastward
toward the borders of Russia. Russia has continually refused
to enter into TNW talks until U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn
from Europe and assurances that nuclear weapons will not be
deployed on the territory of new NATO members are met. Anxieties
are bound to resurface as the Baltic nations prepare to join
NATO and questions will likely be raised about what role former
Soviet states bordering mainland Russia might play as new
NATO members in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) or as nuclear-capable
members.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all countries expected to
join NATO as part of this enlargement, recently denied any
deployment plans (at least in the "foreseeable future" according
to the Estonian spokesperson), and a NATO official stated
that Russians concerns about nuclear weapons in the Baltics
"were politely rebuffed."(11) Whether
it be political or security related reasons, Russia will likely
raise concerns in the future about NATO nuclear weapons in
an expanding NATO - particularly in the Baltic region.
By the same token the new NATO countries may also raise concerns
about Russia's tactical nuclear weapons. Last year Moscow
adamantly denied reports that it had moved tactical nuclear
weapons into Kaliningrad -the small Russian enclave located
between Poland in Lithuania - but speculation about this possibility
raised tensions in the region.(12) Addressing
these issues now, while NATO-Russia relations are stronger,
may help to inoculate against future dangers and anxieties
on all sides.
4. U.S. Nuclear Posture, New Nuclear Weapons
The fourth and final problem relates to U.S. plans to develop
new nuclear weapons. Proposed new directions outlined in the
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review will have a negative effect on
NATO's efforts to work with Russia on TNW control.
Since September 11, 2001, the Pentagon has concluded that
deterrence is no longer as central to nuclear planning and
has instead increased emphasis upon potential new roles for
nuclear weapons in addressing terrorist threats. According
to classified excerpts of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review
leaked to the U.S. media, there are demands for the development
of new or modified battlefield weapons. The objective is to
increase the penetration capability of the B-61 model 11 nuclear
bomb, configured as an earth-penetrating bomb designed to
defeat hardened and deeply buried targets. In its recently
passed Defense Authorization bill, Congress approved a $15
million administration request to fund the initial stages
of this effort with development of a "Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator (RNEP), but Congress also requested a study to
look at how the RNEP would be used and whether conventional
weapons could be just as effective.
For now, Washington's current emphasis on development of
usable nuclear weapons is out of step with NATO's belief that
nuclear forces continue to serve a "fundamentally political
purpose to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind
of war."(13) But efforts are underway to synchronize the U.S. and alliance
nuclear posture. The Pentagon review stated plans to "assess
whether any modifications to current posture are appropriate
to adapt to the changing threat environment. A plan is underway
to conduct a review of U.S. and allied dual capable aircraft
in Europe and present recommendations to ministers in summer
of 2002."(14) The NATO Defense Planning
Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group did meet in Brussels
on June 6, 2002 and adopted a new set of NATO force goals
for the period of 2003-2008 in order "to ensure that the Alliance
has the structures and deployable forces capable of fulfilling
its fundamental security tasks in a changing strategic environment,
including responding to the threats posed by terrorism and
the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction."(15)
While details are sparse on the nuclear aspects of the review,
the historically close coordination between U.S. and NATO
doctrine and military planning indicate that the updated U.S.
nuclear posture foreshadows likely alterations to NATO posture.
This could entail providing expanded roles for nuclear weapons
by, for example, including threats with weapons of mass destruction,
not only threats from nuclear weapons, as justification for
a U.S. or NATO nuclear strike. For obvious reasons, the development
and intent to use such weapons in war-fighting and pre-emptive
counterproliferation roles run contrary to the core nonproliferation
goals of the alliance, by providing, rather than reducing,
incentives to other countries to develop their own nuclear
weapons and by condoning the use of nuclear weapons.
Although Russia is not necessarily concerned that new nuclear
weapons would be used against it, the development of new roles
for tactical nuclear weapons (particularly if any reorientation
were planned for U.S. weapons on European territory) will
provide Russia with little incentive to share information
with the alliance about its own tactical weapons.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- NATO must update its December 2000 document on Confidence
and Security Building Measures to reflect: a) profound changes
in the security environment since then; and b) the fact
that a new NATO-Russia Council has been established. As
part of this process the alliance should give regular publicly
available reports to appropriate legislative oversight committees
in member states. NATO should also review the overall "paragraph
32 Process"(16) reassessing the proliferation risks associated with NATO's nuclear
weapons policy in the context of its five year old Strategic
Concept document.
- The deadlock on this issue remains because NATO and Russia
have diametrically opposed positions on the continued presence
of NATO nuclear weapons in Europe. In negotiations Russia
has repeatedly asserted that it will not consider negotiations
to control its tactical nuclear arsenal if the United States
will not remove its nuclear weapons from Europe. NATO must
be willing to take the first tangible step and offer inducements
to Russia with an eye toward building confidence and reducing
threats associated with its tactical nuclear weapons. The
United States and NATO could compile and offer the comparable
data about their own tactical arsenals that they wish to
acquire from Russia. This could include information about
numbers, locations and safety conditions of storage of warheads.
NATO could also invite Russia to conduct on-site base visits
to NATO nuclear weapons storage facilities.
- NATO should allocate funding for and implement threat
reduction programs dedicated to accounting for TNWs in Russia.
This could follow the contours of existing US-Russia threat
reduction programs, such as the Nunn-Lugar program, and
build on its computerized data management system.
- NATO should offer unambiguous assurances that it will
not modify, redesign, or increase roles for European nuclear
forces.
- NATO must give stronger assurances about the commitment
to not allow new member states to train to use, or deploy
NATO nuclear weapons. In the last round of NATO enlargement
NATO stated that has no intention, plan or reason to station
nuclear weapons on the territory of the new NATO member
states (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland at the time)
and that no storage facilities would be built in the new
NATO member states. Before any new members are admitted
to the alliance -- rather than a offering reversible statement
of intent -- NATO should make a firm codified commitment
not to station any nuclear weapons or to build any dual
capable or nuclear weapons facilities in any new NATO member
states now or in the future.
ENDNOTES
(1) Lord Robertson, "NATO: A Vision for
2012," Speech by NATO Secretary General, "Prague 2002: Challenge
and Change for NATO" Organized by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Hosted by the Transatlantic Center of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels, October 3, 2002.http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003a.htm#qa,
version current on Nov. 20, 2002.
(2) Butcher, M., Nassauer, O., and Young,
S., "Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear
Risk Reduction," BASIC/BITS Research Report, British American
Security Information Council (BASIC) / Berlin Information-center
for Transatlantic Security (BITS), December 1998. Also see,
Nassauer, O. "NATO's Nuclear Posture Review Should Europe
End Nuclear Sharing?", BITS Policy Note 02.1, BITS, April
2002. (The author notes that up to 360 U.S. weapons could
be stored at NATO bases, although the actual number might
be significantly lower.) According to Hans Kristensen and
Joshua Handler's estimates, approximately 3,400 Russian non-strategic
nuclear weapons have been "kept for operational use by the
Russian Navy, and Air Force, including those for air defense.
The remainder . . . are in storage, some or all of which are
destined to be dismantled." SIPRI, SIPRI Year Book 2002: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2002). William Arkin, Robert Norris and Joshua Handler,
note that the remainder could include of 12,000 non-strategic
warheads in reserve and/or awaiting dismantlement. See Arkin,
W., Norris, R. and Handler, J., Taking Stock - World-wide
Nuclear Deployments, (Natural Resources Defense Council, 1998),
p.27.
(3) Millar, A., "The Pressing Need for
Tactical Nuclear Weapons Control," Arms Control Today, May
2002. pp. 10-13.
(4) See Gordon, M. R., "Misunderstandings
Still Hinder Russia-NATO Partnership," New York Times, May
28, 1998.
(5) Nunn, S., Perry, W., and Habiger, E.,
"Still Missing: A Nuclear Strategy," Washington Post, May
21, 2002.
(6) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings
on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, July 25,
2002. For relevant excerpt of hearing transcript see Porth,
J. "Rumsfeld: U.S. Will Continue to Provide Allies with Nuclear
Umbrella" Washington File U.S. Embassy of Japan http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhse1540.html,
version current on Nov. 20, 2002.
(7) Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on
the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, July 9, 2002.
(8) For the full report see NATO Press
Communiqué M-Nac-2(2000)121, "Report on Options for
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs),Verification,
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament," December
14, 2000 http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-121e/home.htm,
version current on Nov. 20, 2002.
(9) Lord Robertson, "Tackling Terror: NATO'S
New Mission," Speech by NATO Secretary General, At the American
Enterprise Institute's New Atlantic Initiative, Washington,
D.C., June 20, 2002. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020620a.htm,
version current on November 20, 2002.
(10) Final Communiqué Ministerial
Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear
Planning Group, Brussels, December 18, 2001. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-170e.htm,
version current on Nov. 20, 2002.
(11) "Baltics Deny They'll Deploy Nuclear
Weapons as NATO Members," Associated Press, September 17,
2002. Chalmers, J., "NATO Rebuffs Russia's Qualms on Baltics,
Georgia," Reuters, September 25, 2002. Kucia, C., "Baltics
Deny Plans to Deploy NATO Nuclear Weapons." Arms Control Today,
October 2002, p.26.
(12) Gertz, B. "Russia Transfers Nuclear
Arms to Baltics," The Washington Times, Jan. 3, 2001. Rozenbergs,
R. "Russian Nukes in Kaliningrad Puts Baltics NATO Bid Back
on Front Burner," Agence France Presse, January 8, 2001. Brantsen,
J., "Russia: Report of Missile Deployment In Kaliningrad Threats
To Upset East/West Ties," Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty,
Jan. 11, 2001. http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/01/11012001122700.asp,
version current on Nov. 20, 2002. Sokov, N., "The "Tactical
Nuclear Weapons Scare" of 2001", CNS Reports, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, January
4, 2001.
(13) Final Communiqué Ministerial
Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear
Planning Group, Brussels, December 18, 2001. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-170e.htm,
version current on Nov. 20, 2002.
(14) Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],
Washington, Jan. 8, 2001, p.4. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm,
version current on Nov. 20, 2002.
(15) Final Communiqué Ministerial
Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear
Planning Group held in Brussels, June 6, 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-071e.htm,
version current on Nov. 20, 2002.
(16) For more information see Tom McDonald,
"Paragraph 32 Process: Final Analysis," BASIC Notes, January
2001. ../pubs/Notes/2001P32.htm,
version current on Nov. 20, 2002.
****
Alistair Millar is Vice President and Director of the
Washington, D.C. office of the Fourth Freedom Forum. He has written several
articles and reports on non-strategic nuclear weapons control
and has edited a forthcoming volume titled "Tactical Nuclear
Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment,"
for Brassey's Books.
Contact: amillar@fourthfreedom.org
Phone: 1 (202) 393 5201
Kathryn Crandall is an Analyst at BASIC focused on nuclear
weapons issues.
Contact: kcrandall@basicint.org
Phone: 1 (202) 347 8340
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