In the latest series of articles reflecting on the anniversary of the May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis, Shaza Arif explores how the episode highlights dynamics of a limited conflict under the nuclear shadow, underscoring the risks of miscalculation, arms competition, and unintended escalation in South Asia. The views expressed belong solely to the author of the article and do not necessarily reflect their government’s position, any affiliated institutions, or that of BASIC. BASIC welcomes other contributions on this topic from a range of perspectives, including from Indian experts and authors. Please get in touch if you are interested in submitting an article.
The South Asian environment is shaped by an enduring rivalry between two nuclear-armed states, India and Pakistan. A stability-instability paradox exists in the region: the presence of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence dynamics upholds strategic stability at the highest level while limited crises continue to persist under the nuclear overhang. This paradox casts a constant shadow of nuclear escalation during conventional conflict. In the last six years alone, the two states have experienced intense escalation due to kinetic military attacks by India in Azad Kashmir and mainland Pakistan in 2019 and 2025, followed by Pakistan’s response each time. In fact, a pattern appears to have emerged where sub-conventional attacks against Indian security forces or civilians are followed by an attack on mainland Pakistan under the pretext that Pakistan is responsible for these sub-conventional attacks.
The May India-Pakistan 2025 conflict will be remembered as a defining moment in South Asian politics, where both nuclear and conventional deterrence were vividly at play. The Indian Air Force (IAF) targeting mainland Pakistan on the night of 7 May showed that, despite the risk of nuclear escalation, India continues to believe that there is space for limited conventional conflict with Pakistan. From an Indian perspective, these actions were presented as a means to impose punitive costs on Pakistan.
By attacking mainland Pakistan across the international border as it had done in 2019, India had climbed a rung on the “escalation ladder”. The attack was met with a swift response from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which executed a coordinated attack against incoming aircraft. However, there was always an element of restraint within the escalation. Pakistan did not escalate to the next rung of the escalation ladder (for example, cross-border targeting or conducting strikes inside Indian territory); instead, it only targeted the attacking Indian jets, which led to the downing of several Indian aircraft – including Rafale jets. While the Indian side later made an indirect and ambiguous acknowledgement that they had experienced some losses, the exact number remains undisclosed.
The PAF had the capability and opportunity to inflict more damage, which could have further enhanced its position and put more pressure on the adversary. However, such an approach was deliberately avoided to minimise any further escalation. The restraint was also visible in its decision to target Indian aircraft from its own airspace.
The subsequent grounding of the IAF led to the use of drones and, later, missiles from the Indian side, which introduced a new dynamic into the regional conflict. In response, Pakistan also used drones that penetrated deep inside Indian territory, as far as New Delhi. In the next cycle, India decided to further escalate with missiles. In particular, the use of the BrahMos cruise missile marked a critical step with direct implications for nuclear deterrence, further ascending the escalation ladder. While BrahMos’s employment was in a conventional role, its dual capability poses the risk that its use in the context of a fast-moving crisis with compressed decision-making time could be mistakenly interpreted as crossing the nuclear threshold, posing serious challenges for escalation management. Following the loss of Indian aerial assets to PAF engagements, key air force bases in Pakistan were targeted. These missile attacks formed part of a broader effort to establish escalation dominance during the crisis by targeting the state’s operational Centre of Gravity (CoG).
Despite the intensity of the attack, Pakistan gave a proportionate response, adhering to a quid pro quo (QPQ) strategy targeting critical military infrastructure. It targeted 26 Indian sites, including the S-400 batteries at Adampur and Bhuj. The neutralisation of more than 77 Indian drones in the conflict further augmented conventional deterrence. The Pakistani response countered Indian coercion without inviting uncontrolled escalation. The multi-domain operation combining kinetic activity, electronic warfare, and cyber-attacks proved notably effective. It denied India aerial reconnaissance and strike capabilities, reinforcing a credible deterrence posture. These developments arguably contributed to India’s decision to terminate the conflict cycle and opt for a US-mediated ceasefire. Pakistan also opted not to climb to the next rung of the escalation ladder since it had already shown the credibility of its conventional deterrence. Hence, Pakistan also responded positively to the cessation of hostilities. As a result, the ceasefire prevented an all-out war between the two states.
It should be noted that both the Indian and Pakistani narratives present contradictory accounts of both the chronology of events and the ceasefire dynamics.
The brief yet intense conflict has offered many insights regarding how escalation dynamics have evolved in South Asia:
Perceptions of Nuclear Credibility
The episode revealed that conflict dynamics are shaped by contrasting perceptions of nuclear credibility. Aiming to garner political mileage, the Indian side, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership, has often referred to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme as the “Nuclear Bluff” and “Nuclear Blackmail”. This rhetoric suggests that Pakistan would never actually use nuclear weapons and can therefore be pushed conventionally. However, in reality, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons continued to influence the freedom of kinetic activity undertaken by the Indian side, placing an operational cap on crisis escalation. Secondly, the nuclear element weighs heavily on the minds of the global actors. Hence, rapid escalation is expected to draw international intervention due to the fear of escalation between the two nuclear-armed states. Both aspects were witnessed during the May 2025 standoff. Overall, emphasising the “Nuclear Bluff” narrative is a dangerous practice that adversely impacts the region’s stability. The recent conflict has highlighted how uncertain escalation becomes when a nuclear-armed state is attacked.
The Role of Airpower
On the conventional front, new escalation dynamics were witnessed. In response to Indian aggression, the PAF played a pivotal role in the conflict. In addition, Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos manifested measured restraint and strategic precision, demonstrating effective use of conventional capabilities. Airspace denial capability, in particular, has redefined conflict dynamics in the India-Pakistan equation. It is evident that the role of airpower in South Asia will be pivotal in any future crisis. As per the new normal established in the region, the PAF showed its capability and credibility by denying India air superiority in contested airspace.
The efficient employment of indigenous and Chinese weaponry, along with integrated multi-domain tactics, led to the grounding of the IAF for 48 hours during the peak of the conflict. New technological procurements and the upgrade of existing weaponry are likely to further fortify the airpower component of conventional deterrence. The disruption of the enemy’s kill chain (the sequential process of detecting, tracking, targeting and engaging hostile assets via effective air denial) helped synchronise Pakistan’s political and military objectives. The battle-proven conventional deterrence role of the PAF is likely to play a leading role in the future given its agility and ability to create a pronounced impact. The episode manifested the doctrinal clarity, foresight of leadership, and rigorous training of the forces that ultimately led to the strategic paralysis of the adversary. In addition, reliance on indigenous and Chinese capabilities provided an edge to Pakistan, whereas reliance on diverse weaponry posed serious synchronisation and integration challenges across the border.
Interplay of Nuclear and Conventional Deterrence
While airpower was a central component during the war, it has to be viewed within the broader deterrence architecture of the region. Given the manner in which conventional and nuclear deterrence operate in South Asia, it is pertinent to analyse their interrelationship. In the larger picture, each reinforces the other. It is the nuclear overhang that reinforces conventional deterrence by enhancing confidence and assertiveness at the conventional level and influencing tactical and operational decision-making. It provides the required confidence, along with psychological and strategic assurance, that is required for conventional posturing. Hence, nuclear deterrence anchors conventional deterrence – an aspect that will influence any future crisis management strategy. In parallel, conventional deterrence reasserts the efficiency of nuclear deterrence when employed effectively, as seen in the recent conflict, signalling capacity and resolve. However, it is important to note that this reinforcement in the South Asian context has the potential to introduce risks and increase the likelihood of miscalculation, particularly by creating overconfidence in limited conventional operations under the assumption of controlled escalation.
Cross-domain Synchronisation
The manner in which nuclear and conventional deterrence have operationalised, along with the use of new capabilities, shows that any conflict between the two states will no longer be confined to a single domain. Pakistan has always relied on multi-domain synchronisation – leveraging multiple domains to counter Indian aggression. In the recent conflict, Pakistan demonstrated a cohesive integration of its conventional capabilities, electronic warfare, diplomacy, information domain, and media in the overall synchronisation of its operational strategy. For a conventionally smaller state, the use of such an approach augments its capability and enhances signalling without crossing thresholds that could trigger escalation. Pakistan exercised calibrated restraint and caution on all levels, which ultimately contributed to the cessation of the standoff.
The Risks of Limited War under the Nuclear Umbrella and New Arms Races
While multi-domain operations enhance calibrated response, they also raise questions regarding escalation unpredictability under the nuclear umbrella. Ideally, such episodes should shrink the space for “limited war under the nuclear umbrella”. On the contrary, historical patterns suggest that new insecurities will surface, followed by more investments in advanced weaponry, reinforcing an arms race. For example, India has recently signed a deal for 114 Rafale aircraft with France – its largest ever military deal. The development seems to be influenced by the May 2025 conflict. Such trends add a new layer of instability in the region.
The problem lies in the fact that the Indian leadership continues to seek space for conventional military actions under the nuclear shadow. This military adventure is being termed by many in New Delhi as the “New Normal”. What is being dubbed the “New Normal” is an irrational approach leading to more instances of brinkmanship under the nuclear shadow. The Indian leadership should recognise that sustaining a new normal of heightened confrontation is inherently challenging against a nuclear-armed adversary with whom India shares a contiguous border spanning over a thousand kilometres. A clear-eyed assessment of the risks associated with cycles of aggression is essential for long-term stability.
The Next Conflict
The most significant implications lie in shaping any future conflict between the two states. The confrontations between the two states have terminated at a ceasefire so far. There is absolutely no guarantee that the next crisis will terminate along similar lines. It is quite possible that the next India-Pakistan conflict may operate at a rung higher than the May 2025 standoff. Furthermore, it is equally likely that the next conflict may be more intense or protracted. In addition, the next conflict could be triggered by events other than a terrorist attack, leading to a different cycle of escalation. Examples of such scenarios could include accidental airspace violations, cyber-attacks on critical national infrastructure, and misread military signalling. Further advancements and the use of emerging technologies (Artificial Intelligence, cyber, hypersonic, and space-based capabilities) are highly likely in any future conflict. If the escalatory cycle continues in such an environment, it will compress decision-making cycles and escalation control, adding more instability. Hence, the institutionalisation of this new normal and escalatory rhetoric, such as calls for Operation Sindoor 2.0, will be inherently detrimental for the region. It can lead to catastrophic situations where both states risk ceding control of the escalation ladder. Any such episode can lead to adversarial repercussions for the region and global security.
Conclusion
A key takeaway is that treating nuclear deterrence as a “nuclear bluff” is not a rational strategy. In a nuclearised environment, adversaries may be tempted to test thresholds that they consider manageable. Once such dynamics unfold, they can invite inadvertent escalation. This assertion underscores a more fundamental point that deterrence aims to prevent wars rather than normalise recurring cycles of coercion. The stability of the region depends upon viewing the regional dynamics through this lens. Ultimately, the stability of South Asia will depend not only on military capability but also on the responsible management of strategic narratives and signalling behaviour. Moving forward, policymakers on both sides must recognise that the pursuit of short-term tactical advantage under the nuclear shadow risks undermining long-term regional stability. In an environment defined by uncertainty and rapid technological change, sustaining credible deterrence while preserving escalation control will remain the central challenge for crisis management in the years ahead.
Shaza Arif is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad. She can be reached at [email protected] / [email protected]